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83 
Public Interest, Professional Bargains: Ethical 
Conflicts between Lawyers and Professional 
Engineers 
Elizabeth J. Hubertz* 
Most environmental law problems are embedded in complex and 
technical factual contexts. Hence, environmental lawyers come to 
expect that at some point it will be necessary to consult with one or 
more non-lawyer experts about, for example, the habitat of an 
endangered plant species, the modeling of a mixing zone at a water 
pollution discharge point, the best available control technology for an 
industrial air emission process, or the consequences of elevated lead 
levels in children.  
Environmental experts come from many fields, including biology, 
geosciences, ecology, chemistry, engineering, social science, and 
economics. Each discipline has its own set of norms, practices, ethics, 
guidelines, and procedures, which differ from those of the legal 
profession. Wherever the disciplines intersect, there is a potential for 
disagreement. This Article examines one such set of potential 
clashes—the conflict between a lawyer‘s duties of loyalty and 
confidentiality, and the engineer‘s paramount duty to the public 
health, safety, and welfare. All lawyers and a subset of engineers—
licensed professional engineers—are bound by codes of ethics that 
carry professional consequences.
1
 What might be a difference in 
opinion over the bounds of the duty owed by each professional to the 
client could become a career-threatening disciplinary violation for 
one of the participants, unless the ethical differences can be resolved. 
 
 
 Clinic Attorney, Washington University School of Law. The author thanks the 
following for their generous support and helpful comments: Robert R. Kuehn, Maxine I. 
Lipeles, Frances E. Martin, Peter W. Goode, James R. Noel, and Pamela L. Sumners. A draft of 
this Article was presented at the Clinical Law Review Writer‘s Workshop at New York 
University School of Law in October 2008. 
 1. See infra notes 6–9 regarding the licensing of lawyers and notes 12–13 regarding the 
licensing of engineers. 
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The potential for these conflicts increases as the professionals work 
more closely with each other.  
This Article first describes the nature of each profession‘s ethical 
code as expressed in terms of its relationship with those outside of the 
profession. Using emblematic ethical problems from each field, the 
Article then explores the potential conflicts between those codes in 
the areas of client confidentiality and duties to the public. Finally, the 
Article examines several strategies for managing conflicts when 
lawyers and professional engineers work together. 
INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers and engineers are subject to different sets of professional 
norms, which are regulated through a variety of enforcement 
mechanisms, ranging from the clearly structured to the relatively 
informal. For example, both lawyers and engineers can be sued 
civilly for negligent performance of their professional duties and held 
liable to third parties for the injuries caused by their actions.
2
 
Lawyers and engineers also may find their professional conduct 
prescribed by statute. For example, an engineer—defined by federal 
environmental law as a ―person in charge of a facility from which a 
hazardous substance is released‖—has a statutorily imposed duty to 
report any hazardous discharge to the ―appropriate‖ federal agency or 
face criminal sanctions.
3
  
Lawyers and professional engineers also are subject to ethical 
rules that govern their professions. These ethical rules include 
elements of both professional competence
4
 and morality,
5
 and usually 
 
 2. Chapter Four of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers summarizes 
the ―circumstances and extent to which lawyers are liable in damages and subject to other civil 
remedies.‖ RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS ch. 4 intro. note (2000). 
See also Bernstein v. Oppenheim & Co., 554 N.Y.S.2d 487, 489–90 (App. Div. 1990) 
(discussing attorney negligence in professional malpractice action); Carter v. Deitz, 556 So. 2d 
842, 843, 861–63 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (discussing elements of professional negligence claim 
against engineering firm that recommended against the installation of a median barrier on the 
Greater New Orleans Bridge).  
 3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)(3) (2006). 
 4. Unethical conduct does not automatically lead to civil liability, although there is some 
overlap. A negligent act can lead to both civil liability and professional discipline. For example, 
an engineering firm and two engineers who helped design and construct the skywalks at the 
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are contained in regulatory codes adopted by states or state agencies. 
Violations of these ethical codes have professional consequences 
instead of, and in some cases in addition to, monetary or penal 
consequences.  
All lawyers face a formal set of professional ethical rules; entry 
into the legal profession is strictly controlled.
6
 Lawyers are licensed 
in every state, and the unauthorized practice of law (―UPL‖) is 
universally prohibited.
7
 Ethical rules are codified and enforced by a 
state or quasi-state body, usually the highest court in the state.
8
 
Lawyers engaging in unethical conduct face a range of sanctions 
depending on the severity of the infraction, up to and including the 
loss of their licenses to practice law.
9
  
 
Kansas City Hyatt Regency Hotel lost their licenses after two skywalks collapsed and killed 
114 people. Duncan v. Mo. Bd. for Architects, Prof‘l Eng‘rs and Land Surveyors, 744 S.W.2d 
524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988). The engineering firm was also sued civilly for its allegedly negligent 
role in the design and construction. In re Federal Skywalk Cases, No. 81-0945-A-CV-W-5, 
1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10116, at *40 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 4, 1983) (listing defendants). See also 68 
Op. Cal. Att‘y Gen. 250 (1985), No. 85-208, 1985 Cal. AG LEXIS 14, *2–3 (Sept. 17, 1985) 
(discussing duty to warn as violation of registered civil engineer‘s ethical rules and as duty in 
tort). 
 5. Professional rules clearly contain a moral element—nearly all codes require honesty 
in dealings with others, for example—but do not attempt to define all professional relations 
morally, and in some cases may impose duties that run contrary to the lawyer‘s personal 
morality. See, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical 
Deliberators?, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 902 (1996) (noting tension between rule-based ethical 
codes and virtue-based decision making); Timothy W. Floyd, Realism, Responsibility, and the 
Good Lawyer: Niebuhrian Perspectives on Legal Ethics, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 587, 587–88 
(1992) (noting conflict between a lawyer‘s duty to ―further a client‘s lawful interests‖ and the 
common good). 
 6. According to the ABA‘s website: ―In order to obtain a license to practice law, almost 
all law school graduates must apply for bar admission through a state board of bar examiners.‖ 
ABA Bar Admissions Basic Overview, http://www.abanet.org/legaled/baradmissions/ 
basicoverview.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2009). Before becoming licensed, a lawyer must have 
obtained an ―acceptable educational credential . . . from a law school that meets educational 
standards‖ and must pass a state-administered bar examination. Id. In addition to these basic 
competence requirements, lawyers must also demonstrate their character and fitness to become 
a member of the state bar. Id. 
 7. ―Today, every state and the District of Columbia prohibits UPL.‖ Susan D. Hoppock, 
Enforcing Unauthorized Practice of Law Prohibitions: The Emergence of the Private Cause of 
Action and its Impact on Effective Enforcement, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 719, 722 (2007).  
 8. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. b 
(2000) (discussing origin and current status of lawyer professional codes).  
 9. For example, a lawyer who is found to have violated the Georgia Rules of 
Professional Conduct is subject to sanctions ranging from the relatively mild ―formal 
admonition,‖ a sanction which does not affect the ability to practice law, to ―disbarment,‖ 
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Regulation of engineers is less all-encompassing. Only 
approximately 33 percent of ―engineers‖—namely, people 
performing engineering tasks—are licensed.10 However, while an 
unlicensed attorney is prohibited from practicing law, an engineer 
without a license is not barred from working as an engineer.
11
 
Licensed engineers operate under a regime similar to that of lawyers. 
They take an examination administered by the state in which they 
wish to practice, obtain a license from that state, and practice 
according to a series of rules developed by engineers themselves.
12
 
Unethical licensed professional engineers, like unethical lawyers, 
face a range of sanctions from the licensing body, including the loss 
of their licenses.
13
  
Unlicensed engineers may agree voluntarily to abide by a code of 
ethics. Any engineer, not only a licensed professional engineer, may 
become a member of a professional engineering society. Many such 
societies require adherence to a code similar to the professional 
engineer‘s ethical code as a condition of membership.14 But the only 
 
which removes the lawyer ―from the practice of law in Georgia.‖ GA. COMP. R & REGS. 4-
102(b)(1), (6) (2008). 
 10. Doug McGuirt, The Professional Engineering Century, PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERING, 
June 2007, at 25, 29 (noting that the 450,000 licensed professional engineers are about a third of 
the United States‘ nearly 1.5 million engineers, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics).  
 11. Some of the reasons that relatively few engineers are licensed, compared to 100 
percent of lawyers, are discussed in more detail below. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 12. For example, New Jersey requires engineers to have completed a curriculum 
consisting of 128 semester hours, 32 of which must be in a ―combination of mathematics and 
basic sciences,‖ 32 of which must be in engineering sciences, and 16 of which must be in 
engineering design. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:40-2.8(b)(1) (2006). The would-be licensed 
professional engineer must pass part ―F‖ of the state‘s engineering examination (Fundamentals 
of Engineering), work four years under the supervision of a licensed professional engineer, and 
pass part ―P‖ of the state exam (Principles and Practice of Engineering). Id. § 2.10(a) 
(prescribing experience requirements); § 2.5(b) (prescribing examination requirements). See 
also NSPE Licensure—How to Get Licensed, http://www.nspe.org/Licensure/HowtoGet 
Licensed/index.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2009) (describing licensing requirements in general 
terms). 
 13. See Duncan v. Mo. Bd. for Architects, Prof‘l Eng‘rs and Land Surveyors, 744 S.W.2d 
524, 527 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (noting availability of range of disciplinary sanctions under 
Missouri Code, including suspension or revocation of license). 
 14. For example, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (―ASME‖) publishes a 
code of ethics for its members, although membership is voluntary and not a prerequisite for 
practice as a mechanical engineer, just as membership in the American Bar Association is not a 
prerequisite to practice as a lawyer. ASME members may become licensed professional 
engineers and subject to the rules and regulations of the states in which they practice, but this 
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sanction for violation of a professional society‘s rules is revocation of 
membership in the society, not the loss of a license or the means of 
working as an engineer.  
What happens when a lawyer works with a licensed professional 
engineer? Does each professional follow the ethical standards 
governing his or her respective profession? What happens if the 
ethical duties required of lawyers diverge from the ethical duties 
required of professional engineers? One conflict can arise when the 
lawyer‘s duty of client confidentiality runs contrary to the 
professional engineer‘s duty to hold paramount the public safety, 
health, and welfare.  
What follows is a look at the nature of the competing duties of 
confidentiality and duty to the public safety, and an analysis of some 
strategies for managing potential conflicts between the two across 
several collaborative settings.  
I. PROFESSIONAL BARGAINS 
Why do professions like law and engineering have an ethical 
regime when other occupations do not? One explanation views the 
professions as making an implied contract with the people and 
institutions outside of the profession.
15
 Under this view, law and 
engineering exist as professions because they and their members have 
made a bargain with the public: let us design our own rules and 
control our own work, and we promise to serve the public in the 
conduct of our profession.
16
 The American Bar Association‘s 
 
license is wholly independent of their membership in ASME. For this reason, codes like 
ASME‘s are described as aspirational or normative, rather than regulatory. See generally Merry 
Bullock & Sangeeta Panicker, Ethics for All: Differences across Scientific Society Codes, 9 SCI. 
& ENGINEERING ETHICS 159 (2003) (comparing codes of scientific societies, using this 
terminology).  
 15. Eliot Freidson is one prominent proponent of this view. See ELIOT FREIDSON, 
PROFESSIONALISM: THE THIRD LOGIC 122–23 (2001) (describing that professionals control 
their own work and justify this independence through service to a larger, socially beneficial 
role). 
 16. Stephen F. Barker describes this bargain as a ―social contract,‖ which he defines as 
follows: 
[T]he profession agrees to curb its self-interested behavior in certain respects so as to 
promote ideals of service, while society, in return, allows the profession to take charge 
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(―ABA‖) Committee on Professionalism describes the legal 
profession as:  
An occupation whose members have special privileges, such as 
exclusive licensing, that are justified by the following 
assumptions: (1) That its practice requires substantial 
intellectual training and the use of complex judgments; (2) 
That since clients cannot adequately evaluate the quality of the 
service, they must trust those they consult; (3) That the client‘s 
trust presupposes that the practitioner‘s self-interest is 
overbalanced by devotion to serving both the client‘s interest 
and the public good; and (4) That the occupation is self-
regulating—that is, organized in such a way as to assure the 
public and the courts that its members are competent, do not 
violate their client‘s trust, and transcend their own self-
interest.
17
  
 Engineers, too, explain their ethical obligations in terms of service 
to the public. The preamble to the National Society of Professional 
Engineers‘ (―NSPE‖) Code of Ethics reads: 
Engineering is an important and learned profession. As 
members of this profession, engineers are expected to exhibit 
the highest standards of honesty and integrity. Engineering has 
a direct and vital impact on the quality of life for all people. 
Accordingly, the services provided by engineers require 
honesty, impartiality, fairness, and equity, and must be 
dedicated to the protection of the public health, safety, and 
welfare. Engineers must perform under a standard of 
professional behavior that requires adherence to the highest 
principles of ethical conduct.
18
 
 
of formulating and administering its own code of behavior, and perhaps even allows it 
a degree of monopoly control over entry into the profession. 
Stephen F. Barker, What is a Profession?, 1 PROF. ETHICS 73, 93 (1992). 
 17. COMM‘N ON PROFESSIONALISM, AMERICAN BAR ASS‘N, ―. . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF 
PUBLIC SERVICE:‖ A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 10–11 
(1986) (footnotes omitted).  
 18. NAT‘L SOC‘Y OF PROF‘L ENG‘RS CODE OF ETHICS FOR ENG‘RS pmbl. (2007), http:// 
www.nspe.org/resources/pdfs/Ethics/CodeofEthics/Code-2007-July.pdf [hereinafter NSPE 
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The NSPE‘s website offers a similar note when introducing the 
Code of Ethics: ―Professional engineers take seriously their 
responsibility—not just for the quality of the jobs they work on—but 
for the safety and well-being of the public at large.‖19 The IEEE 
(formerly the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc.), a 
voluntary engineering society, likewise explains its members‘ 
commitment to ethical standards in light of service to the public, as 
well as the profession:  
WE, THE MEMBERS OF THE IEEE, in recognition of the 
importance of our technologies in affecting the quality of life 
throughout the world, and in accepting a personal obligation to 
our profession, its members and the communities we serve, do 
hereby commit ourselves to the highest ethical and 
professional conduct . . . .
20
 
 If, in some sense, both law and engineering have made bargains 
with society, promising to pursue their professions while keeping in 
mind the interests of those outside of the profession, what are the 
terms of the bargains? Both professions promise to serve the public, 
but each has a different understanding of its required responsibility 
toward the public good. Conflicts between the professional ethical 
rules can reflect these different bargains and understandings. 
A. The Lawyer’s Bargain 
The history of lawyers‘ codes of ethics is traceable to the oaths of 
conduct taken by advocates in the courts of thirteenth-century 
England.
21
 In the United States, the ABA has had formal rules of 
professional ethics since at least 1908.
22
 The ABA‘s current ethical 
 
CODE OF ETHICS]. 
 19. NSPE Engineering Ethics, http://www.nspe.org/Ethics/index.html (last visited Sept. 
15, 2009). 
 20. IEEE CODE OF ETHICS (2006), http://www.ieee.org/portal/cms_docs/about/CoE_ 
poster.pdf. 
 21. See generally Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year 
Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1390–409 (2004) (describing oaths, statutes, and ethical rules 
applicable to ―professional pleaders‖ in English courts).  
 22. Unlike today‘s ethical codes, the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics were 
―admonitions emanating from a merely private organization,‖ and had ―no direct legal effect, 
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rules are the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (―Model Rules‖), 
adopted in 1983 by the ABA House of Delegates. They serve as a 
model for the states, which bear responsibility for the administration 
of lawyer ethical discipline.
23
 Today, only California‘s ethical rules 
for lawyers do not at least ―follow the format‖ of the Model Rules.24  
The preamble to the Model Rules describes the legal profession‘s 
―ideals of public service‖ and the lawyer‘s obligation to serve the 
larger public.
25
 Lawyers should ―seek improvement of the law,‖ 
greater ―access to the legal system,‖ better administration of justice, 
and increased ―quality of service‖ in legal representation.26 Lawyers 
have a responsibility to ―cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its 
use for clients‖ and to ―employ that knowledge in reform of the law 
. . . .‖27 Lawyers should ―further the public‘s understanding of and 
confidence in the rule of law and the justice system‖ and should be 
―mindful of deficiencies in the administration of justice.‖28 Lawyers 
should be aware that many people do not have access to adequate 
legal counsel and thus should ―devote professional time and 
resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our system 
of justice . . . .‖29 
The benefit of the bargain is most explicitly spelled out in the 
preamble‘s final paragraphs: 
 
either in grievance proceedings against lawyer misconduct or in civil actions for legal 
malpractice.‖ Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239, 1250 
(1991). The 1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama Bar Association was the first statewide ethical 
code to be officially adopted. See Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code of 
Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471–72 (1998). The ABA‘s 1908 
Code was based largely on the 1887 Alabama code. See id. at 504–07.  
 23. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT (2009) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. Enforcement 
of the ethical rules, through the discipline of lawyers, is accomplished by an independent 
agency of the state, which typically is an agency of the state‘s supreme court. Charles Wolfram, 
Toward a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics—II The Modern Era, 15 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 205, 206 (2002).  
 24. ABA Ctr. for Prof‘l Responsibility, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/model_rules.html 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2009).  
 25. MODEL RULES pmbl. para. 7. 
 26. Id. para. 6. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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 To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their 
professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is 
obviated.  
. . . . 
 The legal profession‘s relative autonomy carries with it 
special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has 
a responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in 
the public interest and not in furtherance of parochial or self-
interested concerns of the bar. 
. . . . 
 Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. The 
fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of 
their relationship to our legal system. The Rules of 
Professional Conduct, when properly applied, serve to define 
that relationship.
30
 
 Lawyers, at least on some abstract level, promise to serve the 
public; in exchange, lawyers are allowed to maintain professional 
autonomy and self-governance.  
The preamble is followed by specific rules that set forth in more 
detail the ethical requirements of practicing law. Model Rules 6.1 
through 6.5 specifically address ―public service.‖31 For the most part, 
these rules are aspirational rather than mandatory, providing for 
―voluntary‖ service and allowing, rather than requiring, lawyers to 
participate in legal services organizations and law reform activities.
32
 
The Model Rules‘ only command is found in Rule 6.2, which dictates 
that lawyers ―shall not seek to avoid an appointment by a tribunal to 
 
 30. Id. paras. 11–13. 
 31. MODEL RULES R. 6.1–6.5. 
 32. Id. at R. 6.1 (Voluntary Pro Bono Publico Service); R. 6.3 (Membership in Legal 
Services Organizations); R. 6.4 (Law Reform Activities Affecting Client Interests). Model Rule 
6.5, Nonprofit and Court-Annexed Limited Legal Services Programs, makes it easier for 
lawyers who choose to participate in programs that provide short-term legal advice to the 
public, such as assistance in filling out forms or answering calls at a legal-advice hotline 
sponsored by the bar association. See id. at R. 6.5 cmt. para. 1. 
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represent a person‖ unless they have ―good cause‖ to do so.33 What 
the preamble giveth, the rules taketh away.
34
  
But the preamble offers another vision of public interest besides 
access to the justice system: the proper administration of justice and 
the improvement of the law. Lawyers serve the public by serving the 
system of justice, and by serving their clients, rather than by 
providing public service directly to members of the public. Viewed 
this way, the Model Rules that describe a lawyer‘s duty to his or her 
clients,
35
 to the courts,
36
 and to other parties that he or she may meet 
while in practice,
37
 fulfill the lawyer‘s end of the public service 
bargain. Lawyers serve the public good by being good lawyers.
38
 
 
 33. Id. at R. 6.2 (Accepting Appointments).  
 34. The advertising rules in Article 7 of the Model Rules can be viewed as describing a 
lawyer‘s duty to benefit—or at least not harm—the general public. See id. at R. 7.1 
(Communication Concerning a Lawyer‘s Services); R. 7.2 (Advertising); R. 7.3 (Direct Contact 
with Prospective Clients); R. 7.4 (Communication of Fields of Practice and Specialization); R. 
7.5 (Firm Names and Letterhead); and R. 7.6 (Political Contributions to Obtain Legal 
Engagements or Appointments by Judges). The rules are grouped together under the somewhat 
euphemistic heading ―Information about Legal Services.‖ 
 35. MODEL RULES R. 1.1 through 1.18 and R. 2.1 deal with the client-lawyer relationship.  
 36. MODEL RULES R. 3.1 through 3.9, grouped under the ―Advocate‖ heading, concern 
the lawyer‘s duties in litigation and during trial.  
 37. MODEL RULES 2.3, 2.4, and 4.1 through 4.4 concern a lawyer‘s duties to ―third 
persons.‖  
 38. This is not to suggest that there is anything remotely approaching unanimity of 
opinion among lawyers or scholars on this point. Within the profession, there are many strong 
critics of the ―zealousness‖ model, under which all other concerns are subordinate to client 
service. See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE (1988); Debra Lyn Bassett, 
Redefining the “Public” Profession, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 721, 768–74 (2005).  
 There are also many who would argue that service to the public does mean that lawyers 
owe an ethical duty to increase public access to legal services by offering services for free or at 
below-market rates, with some arguing that this service should be part of the legal ethical 
requirements. Roger C. Cramton, Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113, 1122–24 
(1991) (describing the ―professional ideal‖ of public service, although not the need for 
mandatory pro bono requirements); Robert Granfield, Institutionalizing Public Service in Law 
School: Results on the Impact of Mandatory Pro Bono Programs, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1355, 
1365–73 (2007) (discussing history of lawyer‘s conceptions of public service and pro bono 
programs); Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 413, 
432 (2003) (arguing that some pro bono contribution is not unreasonable to expect from 
lawyers in exchange for the privileged status society has bestowed). 
 As a further caution, the public pronouncements of the bar—including its ethical rules—
may or may not reflect the profession‘s internal norms. E.g., Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as 
Bar Politics: The Making of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
677 (1989). As Schneyer emphasizes, the bar is by no means monolithic, and it would be a 
mistake to suggest that there is a single ideology common to the entire bar. Id. at 679–80. 
Nonetheless, lawyers have chosen to enshrine zealousness or diligence—as in Model Rule 
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In practice, of course, it is not always clear that good lawyering 
and the public good are aligned. The preamble acknowledges this 
bluntly: ―In the nature of law practice, however, conflicting 
responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical 
problems arise from conflict between a lawyer‘s responsibilities to 
clients, to the legal system and to the lawyer‘s own interest in 
remaining an ethical person while earning a satisfactory living.‖39 
It does not take a lot of imagination to come up with a scenario in 
which the lawyer‘s responsibilities to the client conflict with his or 
her responsibilities to the legal system. One such ethical issue 
involves the lawyer‘s duty to keep client information confidential. 
The duty of confidentiality is ―a fundamental principle in the client-
lawyer relationship‖ and is the basis for ―the trust that is the hallmark 
of the . . . relationship.‖40 Model Rule 1.6 requires lawyers to keep 
client information confidential: ―A lawyer shall not reveal 
information relating to representation of a client . . . .‖41 Lawyers can 
reveal confidential client information if the client allows it,
42
 if the 
lawyer is ordered to do so,
43
 or if the lawyer needs to do so in order to 
act in his or her self-defense.
44
 A lawyer also is allowed to reveal 
confidential information to protect innocent third parties, but only 
where the lawyer ―reasonably believes‖ it is necessary ―to prevent 
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm,‖ ―to prevent the 
client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to 
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of 
 
1.3—but not mandatory pro bono service, in the ethical code that governs their behavior. For 
better or worse, these are the rules by which lawyers live. 
 39. MODEL RULES pmbl. para. 9. 
 40. MODEL RULES R. 1.6. cmt. para. 2. But cf. Fred C. Zacharias, The Future Structure 
and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False Paradigms in Legal 
Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 829, 844–50 (2002) (calling belief in lawyers‘ virtue a 
―fiction,‖ and citing empirical studies).  
 41. MODEL RULES R. 1.6. 
 42. More precisely, when the client gives ―informed consent‖ or ―impliedly authorize[s]‖ 
the lawyer to do so by the nature of the representation. MODEL RULES R. 1.6(a).  
 43. MODEL RULES R. 1.6(b)(6) (stating that a lawyer may reveal information relating to 
the representation of a client in order ―to comply with other law or a court order‖). 
 44. For example, the lawyer can reveal confidential information in order to seek legal 
advice about how to proceed ethically. MODEL RULES R. 1.6(b)(4). Also, if a lawyer is sued by 
the client or called to answer for conduct during the representation, he or she is allowed to use 
otherwise confidential information. MODEL RULES R. 1.6(b)(5).  
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another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the 
lawyer‘s services,‖ or ―to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial 
injury to the financial interests or property of another that is 
reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client‘s 
commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the client has 
used the lawyer‘s services . . . .‖45 In all of these circumstances, the 
lawyer does not have to reveal the confidential information. In most 
states, it is not a violation of the Model Rules if the lawyer chooses 
not to disclose.
46
  
At the same time, Model Rule 8, titled ―Maintaining the Integrity 
of the Profession,‖ states that it is ―professional misconduct‖ for a 
lawyer to ―engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration 
of justice,‖47 or conduct that involves fraud or deceit, or that is 
criminal.
48
 Model Rule 3, titled ―Advocate,‖ gives some idea of what 
this misconduct might look like. Lawyers cannot ―knowingly‖ make 
a false statement or fail to correct a false statement made to a 
―tribunal,‖ or ―offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.‖49 
Lawyers also cannot obstruct access to, falsify, nor destroy evidence, 
or present testimony that is false or the result of bribery.
50
 But what 
happens when a lawyer‘s duty to keep client information confidential 
 
 45. MODEL RULES R. 1.6(b)(1)–(3).  
 46. MODEL RULES R. 1.6 cmt. para. 15 (―A lawyer‘s decision not to disclose as permitted 
by paragraph (b) does not violate this Rule.‖). Having identified this Model Rule as the 
professional high-water line of client confidentiality, it is important to note that not every state 
has adopted Model Rule 1.6 verbatim, and that many states have expanded the circumstances in 
which a lawyer may (or even must) reveal confidential client information. See Susanna 
Felleman, Ethical Dilemmas and the Multistate Lawyer: A Proposed Amendment to the Choice-
of-Law Rule in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1500, 1507–08 
(1995) (calling the lack of uniform adoption of Model Rule 1.6 by each state ―[o]ne of the most 
glaring examples of conflict‖ among the states‘ ethical rules); Jason Popp, The Cost of 
Attorney-Client Confidentiality in Post 9/11 America, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 875, 878–80 
(2007) (providing the history of the current Model Rule 1.6 and cataloguing its variations by 
states). Florida‘s version of the Model Rule requires a lawyer to disclose confidential 
information when the lawyer ―reasonably believes necessary . . . to prevent a death or 
substantial bodily harm to another.‖ FLA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6(b)(2) (2008). 
Similarly, Virginia requires a lawyer to ―promptly reveal the intention of a client, as stated by 
the client, to commit a crime . . . .‖ VA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(1) (2009).  
 47. MODEL RULES R. 8.4(d). 
 48. Id. at R. 8.4(c).  
 49. Id. at R. 3.3(a)(1), (3). 
 50. Id. at R. 3.4(a)–(b). 
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collides with the duty to avoid ―conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice‖? 
A staple of legal ethics education commonly known as the Lake 
Pleasant Bodies case highlights this conflict.
51
 Two lawyers, Frank H. 
Armani and Francis R. Belge, were appointed to defend Robert F. 
Garrow, Jr., a man accused of murder.
52
 Garrow confessed to the 
lawyers that he committed the murder. He also confessed that he 
killed at least three other people and told the lawyers where to find 
two of the bodies. The lawyers verified Garrow‘s story by going to 
the respective scenes and photographing the bodies. At the time of 
the lawyers‘ expedition, police and family members did not know 
where the bodies were. The lawyers had to decide whether to honor 
the ethical rules requiring them to maintain client confidentiality and 
zealously serve their client‘s interests, since his interests emphatically 
were not served by disclosure, or whether to serve ―the 
administration of justice‖ and tell the authorities where the bodies 
were and how they came to know the location.
53
  
The lawyers elected to remain silent and proceed with an insanity 
defense for the client. When the father of one of the victims visited 
lawyer Armani‘s office, asking if he knew anything of his daughter‘s 
whereabouts, Armani lied to him.
54
 The bodies eventually were 
found, but no one was able to connect the bodies to the accused until 
his trial. At that point, Garrow testified to the three additional killings 
in support of his insanity defense. The lawyers then admitted at a 
 
 51. This example is also known as the ―Dead Bodies Case‖ and the ―Garrows Dead 
Bodies Case.‖ The events took place in Syracuse, New York, during the 1970s and were the 
subject of many newspaper reports and court proceedings. This scenario (or a variation of it) 
can be found in a number of standard law school ethics textbooks and hornbooks. See, e.g., 
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P. KONIAK & ROGER C. CRAMTON, THE LAW AND ETHICS 
OF LAWYERING 57–59 (3d ed. 1999); ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 221–26 (3d ed. 1989); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, 
664–66 (1986). One of the lawyers later wrote a book about his experience, from which some 
of the facts as described in this Article are taken. TOM ALIBRANDI & FRANK H. ARMANI, 
PRIVILEGED INFORMATION 87–89, 100–03, 148–49, 165–66 (1984).  
 52. People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (County Ct. 1975), aff’d 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (App. 
Div. 1975) and 359 N.E.2d 377, 41 N.Y.2d 60, 390 N.Y.S.2d 867 (1976). Some of the facts are 
also set forth in In re Armani, 371 N.Y.S.2d 563 (County Ct. 1975), and People v. Garrow, 379 
N.Y.S.2d 185 (Sup. Ct. 1975). 
 53. MODEL RULES pmbl. para. 6. 
 54. Mr. Armani regretted this very much, and later asked the father‘s forgiveness for 
―lying to you in my office that day.‖ ALIBRANDI & ARMANI, supra note 51, at 152. 
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press conference that they had known for months where the bodies 
were.  
Did the lawyers act ethically? Many commentators thought not. 
As one report put it: ―Members of the public were shocked at the 
apparent callousness of these lawyers, whose conduct was seen as 
typifying the unhealthy lack of concern of most lawyers with the 
public interest and with simple decency.‖55 After ―[p]ublic 
indignation reached the fever pitch,‖56 the district attorney indicted 
attorney Belge for violating state laws requiring a decent burial and 
notification of authorities upon learning of a death.
57
 The court 
dismissed the charges, finding that Belge had ―conducted himself as 
an officer of the court with all the zeal at his command to protect the 
constitutional rights of his client.‖58  
Returning to the bargain, Belge and Armani‘s experience reveals a 
split between what we might call popular conceptions of ethics and 
the lawyer‘s conception of ethics. It seems clear that members of the 
public—including mostly non-lawyers, one would assume—were 
indignant at the lawyers‘ behavior and their seeming disregard for 
―the public interest.‖59 In contrast, some lawyers and judges found 
the behavior to be entirely consistent with the public interest and with 
the lawyers‘ core professional duties.60  
The Lake Pleasant Bodies scenario also illuminates how the 
lawyers‘ ethical code conceives of the lawyer‘s bargain with the 
public. Lawyers as a profession may well have a different conception 
of the public interest than does the public, at least in a dramatic 
 
 55. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 801–02. 
 56. Id. at 799. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 803. 
 59. Id. at 801. 
 60. People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 803 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1975) (―[I]t is the decision of 
this court that Francis R. Belge conducted himself as an officer of the court with all the zeal at 
his command to protect the constitutional rights of his client.‖); In the Matter of Armani, 371 
N.Y.S.2d 563, 563, 566–67 (Hamilton Cty., N.Y. 1975) (―The court is not hesitant to point out 
that counsel for the defendant devoted extraordinary energy and talent to the defense in this 
case. . . . Who, indeed, in the legal profession can truly and objectively look back from the 
comfortable chair of the Monday morning quarterback and say, ‗I would have done thus and so 
in spite of the ethic of confidentiality which I am sworn to uphold‘? Indeed, who can 
understand the anguish of having to defend oneself months later against charge of criminal 
wrongdoing where one has acted in the highest tradition of the legal profession?‖).  
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example like this one. In choosing between duties to ―the public‖—
whether that is conceived as the government, the citizenry, or simply 
third parties who are not clients—and the duty to a lawyer‘s client, at 
least some lawyers and courts are willing to suggest that the client 
comes first.
61
  
B. The Engineer’s Bargain 
The licensed members of the engineering profession are governed 
by a code of ethics that operates in much the same way as the 
lawyers‘ rules of professional responsibility. Since the 1960s, the 
NSPE has published its own Code of Ethics, akin to the ABA‘s 
Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.
62 
Just as the Model Rules 
are made enforceable through their adoption by each state‘s official 
bar regulatory organization, the NSPE Code of Ethics is adopted in 
one form or another by the states that license engineers, usually 
through incorporation in the regulations that govern licensing.
63
  
The NSPE Code of Ethics contains four sections, running from the 
more abstract preamble and Fundamental Canons to the more 
detailed and specific Rules of Practice and Professional Obligations. 
Traces of the engineer‘s bargain with the public can be found in each 
section.  
According to the preamble, ―[e]ngineering has a direct and vital 
impact on the quality of life for all people. Accordingly, the services 
provided by engineers require honesty, impartiality, fairness, and 
equity, and must be dedicated to the protection of the public health, 
safety, and welfare.‖64 The Fundamental Canons are short rules that 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. MICHAEL DAVIS, THINKING LIKE AN ENGINEER 46 (1998). The earliest codes 
appeared around the same time as the 1908 ABA Canons, with the American Institute of 
Electrical Engineers adopting an ethics code in 1912. Id. at 45. Other engineering organizations 
followed with their own codes shortly thereafter. Id. Like the Canons, these codes were not 
intended to be used in grievances or malpractice actions.  
 63. In Missouri, for example, professional engineers and engineering interns are regulated 
by the Board for Architects, Professional Engineers, Professional Land Surveyors, and 
Landscape Architects, which is part of the Missouri Division of Professional Registration. MO. 
REV. STAT. § 327 (2000). The Code of Professional Conduct applicable to the professions it 
regulates can be found at MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 2030-2.010 (2007). It incorporates 
the concepts of the NSPE Code, although it does not share its structure.  
 64. NSPE CODE OF ETHICS pmbl. (2007), http://www.nspe.org/resources/pdfs/Ethics/ 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 31:83 
 
 
amplify the themes found in the Preamble. The first of these Canons 
plainly states the engineer‘s duty to the public: the engineer ―shall 
hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.‖65 
Canon 3 also contains elements of the bargain. It acknowledges the 
effect an engineer‘s work has on the larger society and orders 
engineers to ―[i]ssue public statements only in an objective and 
truthful manner.‖66  
The Rules of Practice are more detailed and amplify the themes 
even further. The first Rule of Practice initially restates the first 
Canon: ―Engineers shall hold paramount the safety, health, and 
welfare of the public.‖67 Its subparts explain what this means. Subpart 
(a) provides, for example, that ―[i]f engineers‘ judgment is overruled 
under circumstances that endanger life or property, they shall notify 
their employer or client and such other authority as may be 
appropriate.‖68 Subpart (b) requires engineers to ―approve only those 
engineering documents that are in conformity with applicable 
standards.‖69 Subpart (f) requires engineers who have ―knowledge of 
any alleged violation of this Code . . . [to] report thereon to 
appropriate professional bodies and, when relevant, also to public 
authorities, and cooperate with the proper authorities in furnishing 
such information or assistance as may be required.‖70 Engineers also 
have a separate set of obligations when interacting directly with ―the 
public.‖ They are to ―issue public statements only in an objective and 
truthful manner.‖71 
The Professional Obligations likewise are more detailed rules 
based on the broad principles in the preamble and Fundamental 
Canons. The second of these is directed specifically at an engineer‘s 
responsibilities to the public—―Engineers shall at all times strive to 
serve the public interest‖72—with its subparts describing the contours 
 
CodeofEthics/Code-2007-July.pdf.  
 65. Id. § I(1). 
 66. Id. § I(3). 
 67. Id. § II(1). 
 68. Id. § II(1)(a). 
 69. Id. § II(1)(b). 
 70. Id. § II(1)(f). 
 71. Id. § III(3). 
 72. Id. § III(2). 
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of that obligation. Most of these are purely hortatory, including 
subpart (a), which encourages engineers ―to participate in civic 
affairs; career guidance for youths; and work for the advancement of 
the safety, health, and well-being of their community.‖ Subpart (c) 
encourages engineers ―to extend public knowledge and appreciation 
of engineering and its achievements.‖73  
Other subparts go further than simple encouragement. Subpart (b) 
is a relatively clear stipulation: ―Engineers shall not complete, sign, 
or seal plans and/or specifications that are not in conformity with 
applicable engineering standards. If the client or employer insists on 
such unprofessional conduct, they shall notify the proper authorities 
and withdraw from further service on the project.‖74 Professional 
Obligation 3 places a duty on engineers to ―avoid all conduct or 
practice that deceives the public.‖75  
The engineer‘s public bargain differs from the lawyer‘s. Like 
lawyers, engineers are not required to provide their services to the 
public on a pro bono basis, nor are they required to ―improve access‖ 
to engineering services, though both are encouraged. Unlike lawyers, 
engineers‘ duties to the public are plainly spelled out in their code of 
ethics. The engineer‘s code explicitly describes the duty in both 
binding and non-binding sections, and explicates that such duty is 
owed to ―the public.‖76 In the Model Rules, the lawyer‘s duty to the 
public is re-conceived as a duty to the administration of justice, and 
to competent and zealous performance of the lawyer‘s role within 
that system, since a smoothly operating and fair justice system is 
itself a public good. For an engineer, ―the protection of the public 
health, safety, and welfare in meeting society‘s needs is at the center 
of the Code.‖77  
 
 73. Id. § III(2)(a), (c). Similarly, subpart (d) encourages engineers to ―adhere to the 
principles of sustainable development in order to protect the environment for future 
generations.‖ Id. § III(2)(d). 
 74. Id. § III(2)(b). 
 75. Id. § III(3).  
 76. See generally NSPE CODE OF ETHICS (2007). 
 77. F. A. Kulacki, The Future Of Callings—An Interdisciplinary Summit on the Public 
Obligations of Professionals into the Next Millennium: Engineering, Engineers and the Public 
Good, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 157, 167 (1999).  
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This is true even though engineers, like lawyers, owe a duty of 
confidentiality to their clients: ―Engineers shall not reveal facts, data, 
or information without the prior consent of the client or employer 
except as authorized or required by law or this Code.‖78 The Code 
also describes an overlapping duty regarding confidential 
information: ―Engineers shall not disclose, without consent, 
confidential information concerning the business affairs or technical 
processes of any present or former client or employer, or public body 
on which they serve.‖79 Engineers also owe a duty of loyalty: 
―Engineers shall act for each employer or client as faithful agents or 
trustees.‖80  
However, the NSPE‘s Board of Ethical Review81 has interpreted 
the NSPE Code to provide that the duty regarding the safety of the 
public may trump considerations of client confidentiality or loyalty. 
Here is one fact pattern:
82
 Engineer A was hired to inspect a sixty-
year-old occupied apartment building on behalf of his client, the 
owner, and to issue a structural report. The engineer and the owner 
agreed that the report would be confidential. Although Engineer A‘s 
inspection showed that the building was structurally sound, the 
engineer learned from the owner that the building contained 
deficiencies in its electrical and mechanical systems in violation of 
various state codes. Because Engineer A had promised the client 
confidentiality, the engineer did not report the deficiencies to any 
third-party authority. The Board found that the failure to report was a 
violation of the NSPE Code, despite the existence of a confidentiality 
agreement and despite the provisions of the NSPE Code that require 
client confidentiality.
83
 When the engineer‘s knowledge of the 
 
 78. NSPE CODE OF ETHICS § II(1)(c). 
 79. Id. § III(4). 
 80. Id. § II(4). Engineers‘ duty of loyalty is explained in both the Rules of Practice and 
Professional Obligations sections describing prohibited conflicts of interest. Id. §§ II(4)(a)–(d), 
III(5).  
 81. According to the NSPE website, the ―Board of Ethical Review is a panel of 
engineering ethics experts‖ that, among other things, ―render[s] impartial opinions pertaining to 
the interpretation of the NSPE Code of Ethics.‖ NSPE Board of Ethical Review, http://www. 
nspe.org/Ethics/BoardofEthicalReview/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). 
 82. See Duty to Report Safety Violations, Case No. 89-07 (NSPE Board of Ethical 
Review Oct. 17, 1989), http://www.nspe.org/resources/pdfs/Ethics/EthicsResources/EthicsCase 
Search/1989/BER89-7.pdf. 
 83. Id. at 4. 
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situation is incomplete, or when the risk to the public safety, health, 
and welfare is remote and contingent, especially when there are other 
methods of lessening the risk besides a report to a third party, an 
engineer has some degree of discretion about whether to report.
84
 The 
engineer must first pursue internal avenues of recourse with his or her 
employer or the client,
85
 but if those fail and the risk is serious, he or 
she must disclose the confidential information where necessary to 
protect the public safety, health, and welfare, even where confidential 
information is involved.
86
  
If the paradigmatic ethical conundrum for lawyers involves the 
client who confesses, the engineering parallel involves the engineer 
who learns that an employer‘s or a client‘s project will endanger the 
public. One often-repeated scenario that illustrates this dilemma 
involves the Challenger space shuttle disaster of 1986.
87
 On January 
27, 1986, the Space Center was counting down to shuttle liftoff the 
following morning. Robert Lund, vice president of engineering for 
Morton Thiokol, had been advised by the engineers he supervised 
that the launch should be postponed. The engineers, including Lund, 
were concerned about the O-rings that sealed the segments of the 
booster rockets. The weather at the launch was expected to be 
unusually cold for Florida—lower than freezing. The engineers 
understood that as the temperature decreased, the O-rings were more 
likely to become less resilient and more likely to erode, causing the 
booster segments to come apart. The O-rings had never been tested at 
 
 84. See Public Health and Safety—Warranty Inspections, Case No. 07-03 at 4 (NSPE 
Board of Ethical Review Apr. 8, 2008), http://www.nspe.org/resources/pdfs/Ethics/Ethics 
Resources/EthicsCaseSearch/2007/BER%2007-3-FINAL.pdf. 
 85. Public Welfare—Design of Medical Equipment, Case No. 08-10 at 3 (NSPE Board of 
Ethical Review Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.nspe.org/resources/pdfs/Ethics/EthicsResources/ 
EthicsCaseSearch/2008/BER%Case%2008-10-FINAL.pdf. 
 86. See Duty to Report Safety Violations, Case No. 89-07 at 4 (―The obligation of the 
engineer to refrain from revealing confidential information, data, facts concerning the business 
affairs of the client without consent of the client is a significant ethical obligation. We further 
believe that matters of public health and safety must take precedence. The NSPE Code of Ethics 
[section II.1] is clear on this point.‖). 
 87. DAVIS, supra note 62, at 43–60. Engineering ethics textbooks also use this example, 
as do a number of business and organizational ethics texts and journals. E.g., GAIL D. BAURA, 
ENGINEERING ETHICS: AN INDUSTRIAL PERSPECTIVE 39–52 (2006); MIKE W. MARTIN & 
ROLAND SCHINZINGER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGINEERING ETHICS 95–102 (2d ed. McGraw-Hill 
2000, 2010). 
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the expected temperature. Based on the engineers‘ recommendations, 
Morton Thiokol told the Space Center to postpone the launch, as it 
had done before upon engineers‘ recommendations.  
However, the Space Center did not want to delay the launch, as 
the space shuttle‘s launch already had been delayed several times. 
NASA needed the approval of the Morton Thiokol engineers to move 
forward with the launch. Lund‘s boss, who was not an engineer, 
reexamined the evidence and decided that the O-rings would not 
significantly erode at the expected temperature. All that was needed 
was approval from engineering. Lund‘s boss told him that he ―needed 
to take off his engineering hat and put on his management hat.‖88 
What should an ethical engineer do at this point?  
The ethics code offers guidance in thinking through the problem. 
Because public safety is ―paramount,‖ when an engineer‘s judgment 
is ―overruled under circumstances that endanger life or property,‖ the 
engineer is supposed to notify his or her employer, the client, and 
―such other authority as may be appropriate.‖89 Engineers also are 
supposed to inform their ―clients or employers when they believe a 
project will not be successful.‖90 They are directed to refuse to 
―complete, sign, or seal plans and/or specifications that are not in 
conformity with applicable engineering standards.‖91 If the client or 
employer insists on moving ahead with the project, the engineer 
―shall notify the proper authorities and withdraw from further service 
on the project.‖92 Weighed against this is the engineer‘s duty to the 
client and employer: to serve them faithfully, to keep confidential 
information confidential, and not to reveal any facts without consent 
unless necessary.  
So what should the Morton Thiokol engineers have done? We 
know the end of the story. Lund took off his engineering hat and 
made a management decision to approve the launch.
93
 Morton 
 
 88. DAVIS, supra note 62, at 44. 
 89. NSPE CODE OF ETHICS § II(1)(a). 
 90. Id. § III(1)(b). 
 91. Id. § III(2)(b). 
 92. Id. 
 93. PRESIDENTIAL COMM‘N, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE 
SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT 94 (1986), http://www.challenger.org/about/assets/nasa_ 
report.pdf (quoting transcript of interview with Lund). 
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Thiokol gave its approval, the launch went forward, the O-rings 
failed, and the shuttle exploded, killing everyone aboard.
94
 
 Hearings and investigations followed.
 
There was more than 
enough blame to go around; popular targets included Morton 
Thiokol‘s management structure,95 NASA‘s management culture,96 
complacency due to the success of previous missions and 
misunderstandings of science and engineering by management,
97
 
engineers wearing a ―management hat‖ instead of an ―engineering 
hat,‖ or some combination of all of these. In hindsight, however, 
most seem to agree that the ethical thing for the engineers to have 
done would have been to keep on their engineering hats and do 
everything in their power to stop the launch. 
When considered next to the Lake Pleasant Bodies case, the 
Challenger scenario illustrates how engineering ethics and legal 
ethics can differ dramatically. Engineers have made a different 
bargain with the public than have lawyers. While engineers owe their 
clients and employers loyalty and confidentiality, these 
considerations are more easily outweighed by an affirmative duty to 
―the public‖—third parties outside of the engineers‘ direct 
employment relationships. If a lawyer can be a good lawyer by 
keeping confidences, an engineer can be a good engineer by 
disclosure—by not keeping confidences. Further, engineers‘ duties to 
the public as described in the code of ethics are more clearly aligned 
with the public‘s conception of those same duties than the ethical 
obligations of lawyers. For example, the public outcry at the Lake 
Pleasant Bodies lawyers‘ ―callous‖ behavior and the subsequent 
indictment suggests that the public expected something different from 
the lawyers. The opposite is true of the Challenger engineers. After 
 
 94. DAVIS, supra note 62, at 43–44. 
 95. Russell P. Boisjoly et al., Roger Boisjoly and the Challenger Disaster: The Ethical 
Dimensions, 8 J. BUS. ETHICS 217, 225–28 (1989) (discussing diffusion of personal 
responsibility); Patricia H. Werhane, Engineers and Management: The Challenge of the 
Challenger Incident, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 605, 611–12 (1991) (discussing ―autocratic‖ culture in 
the Wasatch division at Thiokol). 
 96. See generally Howard S. Schwartz, On the Psychodynamics of Organizational 
Disaster: The Case of the Space Shuttle Challenger, 2 COLUM. J. WORLD BUS. 59 (1987).  
 97. PRESIDENTIAL COMM‘N, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE 
SHUTTLE CHALLENGER ACCIDENT app. F (discussing widely differing conceptions of risks 
involved). 
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all, Lund had to ―take off his engineering hat‖ to reach the point 
where he could agree to the launch, suggesting that his ―engineering 
hat‖ constrained him from giving approval.  
II. COLLISIONS OF CODES: LAWYERS AND ENGINEERS WORKING 
TOGETHER 
Because law and engineering have different concepts of their 
members‘ professional roles and different concepts of their 
professions‘ duties to the public, is it ethically possible for lawyers 
and engineers to work together? If there is a collision of codes, which 
code, if any, comes out on top? And does it matter whether the 
lawyers and engineers work together under the same roof or whether 
their collaboration takes place at a greater distance? 
A. Disclosure versus Confidentiality: The Nature of the Conflict 
While the interests of clients generally are paramount for lawyers, 
the safety and welfare of the public is paramount for engineers. As 
the cases discussed above make clear, one can expect ethical conflict 
between the two professions, at least in some cases. The Lake 
Pleasant Bodies and Challenger cases are iconic, but most lawyers 
and professional engineers will not face these extreme situations even 
once in a decades-long career. A more mundane example is taken 
from the comments to Model Rule 1.6. A lawyer represents a 
company and learns that a company plant accidentally has dumped 
industrial waste into a stream, in violation of both the company‘s 
permit and state law.
98
 The comments suggest that the lawyer would 
be allowed, but not required, to reveal this information to the 
authorities under limited circumstances: (1) ―if there is a present and 
substantial risk that a person who drinks the water will contract a life-
threatening or debilitating disease,‖ and (2) ―if the lawyer‘s 
disclosure is necessary to eliminate the threat or reduce the number of 
victims.‖99 The comments leave their corollary unspoken: if the 
situation falls short of a ―present and substantial risk‖—if the illness 
 
 98. MODEL RULES R. 1.6 cmt. para. 6.  
 99. Id. 
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is neither ―life-threatening [n]or debilitating‖—or if disclosure would 
not reduce the number of victims, the lawyer is not ethically 
permitted to reveal the confidential information under this Rule.
100
  
What about the licensed professional engineer working with the 
lawyer? The engineer‘s duty is to ―[h]old paramount the safety, 
health, and welfare of the public.‖101 The NSPE Board of Ethical 
Review has described the duty thusly: ―[W]here an engineer 
determines that a case may involve a danger to the public safety, the 
engineer has not merely an ‗ethical right‘ but an ‗ethical obligation‘ 
to report the matter to the proper authorities and withdraw from 
further service on the project.‖102 Thus, it would seem that the 
engineer‘s duty is broader than the lawyer‘s. An engineer might have 
a duty to disclose information to the authorities if the contamination 
might make people marginally sick, instead of possibly killing them, 
whereas the lawyer would have to remain silent if he or she learned 
of the information through the representation of the client.  
As a practical matter, not every state has adopted Model Rule 1.6. 
But even in those states that have changed the Model Rule to allow 
for or mandate greater disclosure of client confidences, the results 
would not necessarily differ. In Florida, for example, the lawyer 
―shall‖ reveal a client‘s confidential information to ―prevent a death 
or substantial bodily harm to another.‖103 However, the Florida rule 
provides no additional guidance where the spill might cause nearby 
residents‘ hair to fall out, but would not cause ―substantial bodily 
harm.‖104  
Another, more common scenario was presented to the NSPE‘s 
Board of Ethical Review (―BER‖). An engineer is hired by a 
corporation to determine whether the manufacturing waste the 
corporation plans to discharge into a body of water will cause the 
 
 100. In some cases, permit holders have a legal duty to report permit violations. The 
regulations implementing the Clean Water Act provide that all permits contain a condition 
requiring the permittee to ―report any [permit] noncompliance which may endanger health or 
the environment.‖ 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(l)(6) (2008). 
 101. NSPE CODE OF ETHICS § I(1). 
 102. Whistleblowing City Engineer, Case No. 88-6 (NSPE Board of Ethical Review 1988), 
available at http://www.niee.org/cases/78-88/case88-6.htm.  
 103. FLA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 4-1.6(b)(2) (2009).  
 104. Id. 
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water to exceed minimum environmental standards, and to prepare a 
written report detailing his findings. During the course of his 
employment, the engineer discovers that the discharge indeed would 
exceed the limits. When he tells the corporation this fact, his contract 
with the corporation is terminated before the report is written. The 
engineer later learns that the state has held a hearing, at which the 
corporation told the state environmental authority that its discharge 
meets environmental standards. The BER presumed that a violation 
of environmental standards was ―detrimental to the public health and 
safety‖ and thus subject to disclosure by the engineer.105 The engineer 
has a duty to inform the authorities after he learns of the hearing.
106
 
But what about the lawyer faced with the same situation? The 
violation of environmental standards would not clearly fall into the 
―reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm‖ exception to the 
lawyer‘s duty of confidentiality.107 Perhaps only aquatic life would be 
affected, in which case the lawyer would be compelled to remain 
silent. This does not end the inquiry, however, as the lawyer may be 
able to disclose the information through another exception. The 
Model Rules also allow disclosure to ―prevent . . . a crime or fraud 
that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another,‖ when the client has used the 
lawyer‘s services in the commission of the crime.108 Some states have 
broadened this provision considerably; Virginia, for example, 
requires lawyers to ―promptly reveal . . . the intention of a client, as 
stated by the client, to commit a crime . . . .‖109 Other states, like 
Oregon, permit lawyers to disclose the client‘s intention to commit a 
crime and ―the information necessary to prevent the crime.‖110 It 
 
 105. Public Welfare—Knowledge of Information Damaging to Client‘s Interest, Case No. 
76-4 (NSPE Board of Ethical Review 1976), http://www.nspe.org/resources/pdfs/Ethics/ 
EthicsResources/EthicsCaseSearch/1976/BER%2076-4.pdf. The fact that Engineer A was 
preparing a ―report‖ rather than the ―plans‖ or ―specifications‖ mentioned in the code was 
immaterial in the view of the BER, which wrote: ―It is basic to the entire concept of a 
profession that its members will devote their interests to the public welfare, as is made 
abundantly clear in . . . the code.‖ Id. (citation omitted). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See MODEL RULES R. 1.6(b)(1). 
 108. Id. at R. 1.6(b)(2). 
 109. VA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(c)(1) (2009).  
 110. OR. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(1) (2009).  
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might be possible to squeeze the corporation‘s polluting discharge 
into this kind of exception. Is it a ―crime‖ to exceed the permit limits? 
Not necessarily. Perhaps making a false statement to the state 
authorities about the discharge counts as a ―crime,‖ but the client 
never announced its intention to make the false statement in advance 
(although such might be inferred from its firing of Engineer A), so 
the crime-fraud exception is unavailable to the lawyer. If the false 
statement already has been made (in the example, Engineer A finds 
out after the fact that his former client has presented false information 
at a hearing), the lawyer‘s disclosure will not prevent a crime.111  
None of this is to suggest that professional engineers do or should 
fail to respect their clients‘ confidences. The NSPE Code requires 
professional engineers to ―notify their employer or client‖ when their 
―judgment is overruled under circumstances that endanger life and 
property,‖112 and the BER has made it clear that notification of ―such 
other authority as may be appropriate‖ should occur if the employer 
or client fails to take meaningful action.
113
 The BER cases also 
caution the engineer about jumping to a conclusion that public danger 
is imminent without being fully aware of the facts or without having 
the expertise to truly evaluate the situation.
114
  
B. Strategies for Collaboration: Avoidance, Harmonization, and 
Containment 
If there is the potential for conflict between the engineer‘s 
―paramount‖ duty to disclose and the lawyer‘s duty of client 
confidentiality, does it matter in practice? Answering that question 
 
 111. Georgia, for example, prohibits lawyers from making use of the crime exception if the 
―harm or loss‖ to the victim already has occurred. GA. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT 1.6(b)(2) 
(2009).  
 112. NSPE CODE OF ETHICS § II(1)(a). 
 113. See Public Welfare—Design of Medical Equipment, Case No. 08-10 at 3 (NSPE 
Board of Ethical Review Mar. 27, 2009), http://www.nspe.org/resources/pdfs/Ethics/Ethics 
Resources/EthicsCaseSearch/2008/BER%20Case%2008-10-FINAL.pdf. In this case, the Board 
of Ethical Review discussed the conflict between the duty to hold public health and safety 
paramount and the duty to faithfully serve one‘s client or employer, noting that ―[o]nly if 
[internal] efforts do not produce satisfactory results should [the engineer] consider exploring 
external avenue[s] for action.‖ Id. 
 114. Id. 
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requires an examination of how lawyers collaborate with 
professionals such as engineers who have extralegal expertise.  
Within environmental law, there are three relatively common 
settings in which lawyers and experts collaborate. The most common 
type of collaboration is the retention of an expert to consult or testify 
in litigation. In this setting, the lawyer works at a law firm, non-profit 
organization, or governmental agency and handles legal matters for a 
client as they arise. When the lawyer perceives that additional, non-
legal expertise is needed, the lawyer engages an expert employed by 
a separate organization who has no previous relationship with the 
lawyer‘s client. The lawyer and expert then work together on the 
client‘s behalf, the lawyer providing legal services, and the expert 
providing extralegal expertise to assist the lawyer. 
In some cases, lawyers and experts share the same employer and 
collaborate more closely on behalf of a shared client. In-house 
counsel for a corporate permittee or a governmental regulator may 
draw on the expertise of environmental specialists who are also 
employed by the corporation or agency. In this situation, the ―client‖ 
is the mutual employer.  
Rarer still is a third type of collaboration in which lawyers and 
experts share a single employer but serve clients other than that 
employer. Some nonprofit groups use this model; for example, 
Earthjustice, a public interest environmental law firm, employs staff 
scientists and researchers in addition to its lawyers. A number of in-
house law school environmental clinics also employ this model.
115
 At 
 
 115. The clinic where the author works, Washington University School of Law‘s 
Interdisciplinary Environmental Clinic, is engaged in this third type of collaboration. Duke 
University‘s Environmental Law and Policy Clinic is a ―joint venture of the Law School and 
the Nicholas School of the Environment,‖ which offers law students and graduate students the 
opportunity to work together in teams representing community organizations as they work 
toward solutions to environmental problems. Duke Law Clinics: Environmental Law and Policy 
Clinic, http://www.law.duke.edu/envlawpolicy/index (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). As part of its 
Environmental and Land Use Law Program, the University of Florida Levin College of Law 
sponsors the Conservation Clinic, in which environmental law students and graduate students 
from conservation-related fields work together on non-litigation-based environmental law and 
policy problems. See University of Florida Levin College of Law, Conservation Clinic, 
http://www.law.ufl.edu/conservation/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). The 
interdisciplinary Environmental Protection Clinic is a joint project of Yale Law School and the 
Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, addressing environmental law and policy 
problems. See Yale Environmental Protection Clinic, http://www.law.yale.edu/academics/ 
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these clinics, teachers and sometimes students from the fields of law, 
environmental studies, and engineering
 
work in multidisciplinary 
teams to provide legal and technical services on a pro bono basis to 
outside clients.
116
 
In all three settings, it is possible that the engineer will discover a 
condition that poses a threat to the public safety, health, or welfare, 
but which the client wants and expects its lawyers to keep 
confidential. Consider a variation on the first example given above. A 
manufacturing plant has accidentally dumped industrial waste into a 
stream. After consulting with its safety personnel, the company has 
contacted its outside counsel to undertake crisis management of the 
incident before news of the spill becomes public.
117
 The lawyers then 
call in an independent environmental engineer to consult with them 
about the extent of the damage caused by the spill. In this situation, 
depending on the nature and seriousness of the spill and the wishes of 
the client, the lawyer and the consulting engineer could find 
themselves at odds. If the outside lawyers and the consulting engineer 
worked under the same roof, instead of at two different firms, the 
potential for conflict would still exist; indeed, it might be more 
difficult to avoid in this shared-office situation. The same is true if 
both the lawyer and the professional engineer worked for the permit-
 
EnvironmentalProtectionClinic.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). The University of Ottawa, in 
partnership with Ecojustice, also operates an interdisciplinary clinic, joining students of law, 
science, and other disciplines to provide environmental law services. See University of Ottawa, 
Environmental Law and Policy Clinic, http://www.commonlaw.uottawa.ca/en/programs/ 
environmental-law/environmental-law-and-policy-clinic.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).  
 116. This type of collaboration presents its own set of ethical issues. The Model Rules 
prohibit lawyers from engaging in some forms of joint practice with non-lawyer 
professionals—what are known as ―multidisciplinary practices‖ (―MDPs‖). MODEL RULES R. 
5.4. Not every type of joint practice is excluded, however. An organization where a lawyer 
serves as the head of a multidisciplinary team, either by employing nonlawyers as part of the 
practice or by retaining nonlawyer professionals from separate firms, is the most clearly 
acceptable type. See ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Hypotheticals and Models, 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdp/multicomhypos.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009); see also Mary 
C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services 
from Lawyers in a Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217, 224 (2000) 
(describing ABA models). 
 117. See Nina Schuyler, Legal Crisis Management: Law Firms Create Diverse Teams to do 
the Job, 2004 SAN FRANCISCO ATT‘Y 28 (2004) (noting the emergence of law firm ―crisis 
management‖ groups who handle press and government inquiries after a client experiences a 
potentially scandalous or otherwise damaging incident).  
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holding company, a very common scenario. The corporate employer 
might want to keep news of the spill undercover, hoping that no one 
will find out before it can undertake cleanup efforts. Depending on 
the circumstances, in-house counsel might be able to oblige the 
request for secrecy, while an in-house engineer might not.  
So how do professional engineers and lawyers handle these types 
of ethical conflicts? The following are three strategies that lessen, 
even if they do not completely eliminate, the conflict between legal 
and engineering ethics across the three settings in which the 
professions are likely to work together, along with a discussion of the 
positive and negative aspects of each.  
1. Avoidance: Hire Engineers Who Are Not Licensed 
Professional Engineers 
Perhaps the most obvious strategy is to avoid the issue altogether. 
Most engineers are not licensed, and do not need to be in order to 
lawfully work as engineers. Indeed, for engineers the default rule is 
―no license‖—a significant difference from the legal profession, 
where an unlicensed lawyer cannot lawfully practice. Why not simply 
let the majority of engineers—those who are not professional 
engineers—be involved with lawyers?  
Of course in practice it is not that simple. First, certain 
engineering tasks require the involvement of a professional engineer. 
According to the NSPE website, only a licensed professional 
engineer may prepare, sign, seal, and submit engineering plans and 
drawings to a public authority for approval, or seal certain types of 
engineering plans and designs for public and private clients.
118
 Many 
state engineering regulators have a similar rule describing which 
tasks may be performed only by professional engineers.
119
 Some state 
statutes or city ordinances require certain reports and projects to be 
prepared and supervised by a professional engineer.
120
 Engineering 
 
 118. NSPE Licensure—Why Get Licensed, http://www.nspe.org/Licensure/WhyGet 
Licensed/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).  
 119. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 89C-3(6), 89C-23 (2007) (defining the ―practice of 
engineering‖ and prohibiting such practice without a license, respectively).  
 120. In New York, for example, many ―plans, specifications and estimates‖ for the 
―construction and maintenance‖ of municipal government public works projects must be made 
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statutes and regulations commonly contain lists of persons who are 
practicing engineering within the meaning of the law, but who are not 
required to be licensed. For example, engineers who perform 
engineering work for a company that designs or manufactures a 
product are not required to have a license, as long as the engineering 
work is connected with the product‘s design or manufacture.121 
Engineering firms may themselves be licensed and employ engineers 
who are not professional engineers.
122
 Some engineers employed by 
public utilities or state and local governments may not need a 
license.
123
 Professors of engineering do not need to be licensed in 
some states.
124
 In other states, specific industries are exempt. For 
instance, Florida‘s laws exempt engineers employed by the aerospace 
industry,
125
 and California‘s laws have an exemption for employees 
of the communications industry.
126
 Branches of engineering may be 
treated differently, as well. California, for example, singles out civil, 
mechanical, and electrical engineers in its licensing provisions.
127
  
Depending on the circumstances and the jurisdiction in which the 
practice is located, it might be possible for a lawyer to engage an 
engineer to perform only those tasks that do not require a licensed 
engineer. In such a scenario, there would be no license-related barrier 
to the law-engineering collaboration. Even so, this does not entirely 
 
by a professional engineer. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 7209.3 (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2009).  
 121. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32–144(C) (2008) (registration requirements do 
not apply to work done by a manufacturing industry or its employees provided the work is ―in 
connection with or incidental to the products . . . of such . . . manufacturing industry . . . .‖); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1163(c)(1) (2006) (describing industrial practice exemption); WISC. STAT. 
ANN. § 443.14(7) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) (license not required for manufacturers and 
employees to perform engineering in the design, assembly, sale or installation of their 
respective products).  
 122. For example, Missouri‘s regulations provide that as long as the firm is owned by at 
least one professional engineer who personally supervises the work of the other engineers and 
―signs off‖ on its quality, the firm itself can hold the license. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, 
§ 2030-10.010 (2008) (corporate certificates of authority). See also MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 327.191(1) (2000) (requiring no license when employed by person or corporation with 
certificate of authority).  
 123. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-2-103(4) (1997) (engineers employed by municipal electric 
systems or co-operatives); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-15-29(b)(2) (2008) (exempting U.S. 
government employees). 
 124. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 471.0035 (West 2006). 
 125. Id. § 471.003(j). 
 126. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6746.1 (West Supp. 2009). 
 127. Id. § 6730. 
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resolve the problem. The nature of the task the engineer is to perform 
on behalf of the lawyer‘s client or the mutual client may require an 
engineering license, depending on how the ―practice of engineering‖ 
is defined in the relevant jurisdiction. Further, if the engineer is to 
provide a written report in connection with litigation or to testify in 
court, it may be desirable to have the credentials of a licensed 
professional engineer. Finally, many engineers voluntarily agree to 
commit themselves to ethical standards through membership in 
engineering societies or otherwise.  
2. Harmonization: Serving the Public Interest  
The conflict between the lawyer‘s duty of confidentiality and the 
engineer‘s duty to disclose information arises when the best interests 
of the client differ from or are even contrary to the public safety, 
health, and welfare. But what if the client‘s interest is in the public 
safety, health, and welfare? For a subset of environmental lawyers—
public interest lawyers—this is the case.  
Like public interest advocates of all stripes, public interest 
environmental lawyers ―promote a common good that extends 
beyond the narrow economic or sectarian goals of their members or 
supporters.‖128 Thus, when acting as a ―private attorney general‖ 
under any number of federal environmental statutes,
129
 public interest 
environmental groups ―sue not to vindicate their personal rights but 
to protect the public‘s interest in a livable environment.‖130 In some 
 
 128. Michael T. Heaney, Public Interest Advocacy, in 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 614, 614 (William A. Darity, Jr. ed., 2008). 
 129. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) 
(2006); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2006); Resource Conservation Recovery 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a) (2006); 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (2006); Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 520, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (2006); Marine 
Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1975 § 105(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1) (2006). 
Although NEPA does not expressly allow for judicial review, courts have held that judicial 
review of agency compliance with NEPA is permissible under the APA. Calvert Cliffs‘ 
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm‘n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
 130. Walter B. Russell, III & Paul Thomas Gregory, Note, Awards of Attorney’s Fees in 
Environmental Litigation: Citizen Suits and the “Appropriate” Standard, 18 GA. L. REV. 307, 
324 (1984). See also Charles C. Steincamp, Citizenship: A Discussion of Environmental Citizen 
Suits, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 72, 72 (1999) (noting contrast between private party citizen suits 
under federal environmental statutes and ―public interest‖ citizen suits under those same 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Public Interest, Professional Bargains 113 
 
 
cases, the public interest encompasses the environment itself; 
Greenpeace, for example, describes itself as existing ―because this 
fragile earth deserves a voice.‖131 Likewise, the lawyers who 
represent these groups serve their clients by helping them further 
―environmental quality and public health‖132—an inherently public 
goal.  
What does this mean for a law-engineering collaboration? Most 
public interest environmental lawyers represent or advise public 
interest environmental groups.
133
 In some cases, the lawyers work for 
a law firm that confines itself to public interest environmental law 
and works with outside technical experts. Some public interest 
organizations employ both lawyers and technical experts.
134
 The 
public orientation allows for a law-engineering collaboration with 
fewer fears of conflicts between the client‘s wishes and the 
engineer‘s duty to protect the public safety, health, and welfare. 
Further, the client‘s status as an environmental public interest group 
means that there are fewer opportunities for conflict between the 
ethical codes of lawyers and professional engineers. For example, if 
clients are not permit-holders, the engineers need not fear that they 
will be ethically compelled to disclose a permit violation or other 
potential threat to the public health that the client would rather keep 
secret.  
 
statutes). This does not mean that the environmental groups and their members have no 
personal stake in the suit. Like any other plaintiffs, they are bound by the standing and 
jurisdictional requirements of Article III.  
 131. Greenpeace International, http://www.greenpeace.org/international/ (last visited Oct. 
20, 2009). The motto of Earthjustice is: ―Because the earth needs a good lawyer.‖ Earthjustice, 
http://www.earthjustice.org/index.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727, 741–42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (―Contemporary public concern for 
protecting nature‘s ecological equilibrium should lead to the conferral of standing upon 
environmental objects to sue for their own preservation.‖). 
 132. Deborah Curran, Reflections on Public Interest Environmental Lawyering in British 
Columbia, 67 ADVOC. 183, 184–85 (2009) (distinguishing environmental law from public 
interest environmental law). See also John E. Bonine, Public Interest Environmental Lawyers—
Global Examples and Personal Reflections, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 451, 452–53 (2004). 
 133. See, e.g., Petition for Review, Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, No. 06-1045 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009) (Earthjustice attorney David S. Baron representing NRDC and Environmental 
Defense Fund (―EDF‖)); Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561 (2007) (EDF‘s deputy 
general counsel, Vickie Patton, along with lawyers from Southern Environmental Law Center, 
represented EDF).  
 134. Earthjustice, EDF, and NRDC are examples of such organizations. 
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This solution, of course, is far from perfect. It may work best in a 
litigation context, where counsel acting as client advocates likely will 
look for the engineering expert who is least likely to hold an opinion 
that will run contrary to the client‘s position in the lawsuit.135 If the 
lawyers and engineers are working under the same roof, this 
necessarily limits the world of clients to those whose views align 
with both legal and engineering concepts of public interest. When 
dealing with concepts like ―public safety‖ and ―public health,‖ there 
is always room for even the most closely aligned professionals to 
differ.  
3. Containment: Lessons from Law-Social Work Collaborations 
Conflicting rules regarding disclosure and confidentiality are not 
unique to the law-engineering collaboration. In fact, the lawyer-social 
worker collaboration is the basis for much discussion on this topic.
136
 
Social workers, like lawyers and professional engineers, are licensed 
by a state or quasi-state organization and are governed by a code of 
ethics. Social workers, when acting in their professional capacity, are 
also required by state statute to report instances of child abuse and 
neglect, even if the information is learned from a client.
137
 If a client 
of a social worker confesses to abuse or relates that he or she has 
 
 135. STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 4–7 (3d ed. 
2004); David S. Caudill, Legal Ethics and Scientific Testimony: In Defense of Manufacturing 
Uncertainty, Deconstructing Expertise and Other Trial Strategies, 52 VILL. L. REV. 953, 955–
56 (2007) (discussing the ethics of presenting and attacking expert scientific testimony).  
 136. See, e.g., Sara R. Benson, Beyond Protective Orders: Interdisciplinary Domestic 
Violence Clinics Facilitate Social Change, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 1 (2007); Alexis 
Anderson, Lynn Barenberg & Paul R. Tremblay, Professional Ethics in Interdisciplinary 
Collaboratives: Zeal, Paternalism and Mandated Reporting, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 659, 711–18 
(2007); Maryann Zavez, The Ethical and Moral Considerations Presented by Lawyer/Social 
Worker Interdisciplinary Collaborations, 5 WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 191 (2005); 
Stacy L. Brustin, Legal Services Provision Through Multidisciplinary Practice—Encouraging 
Holistic Advocacy while Protecting Ethical Interests, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 787 (2002); J. 
Michael Norwood & Alan Paterson, Problem-Solving in a Multidisciplinary Environment? 
Must Ethics Get in the Way of Holistic Services?, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 337 (2002); Jacqueline 
St. Joan, Building Bridges, Building Walls: Collaboration between Lawyers and Social Workers 
in a Domestic Violence Clinic and Issues of Client Confidentiality, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 403 
(2001).  
 137. See Anderson, Barenberg & Tremblay, supra note 136, at 692–93 (discussing state 
mandated reporting statutes).  
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been abused, the social worker has to report the information as 
required by the statute.
138
 Failure to report can be a crime for which 
there usually are civil consequences, and which may result in the loss 
of the social worker‘s license.139 A lawyer, upon hearing the same 
information, does not have to report it, and could be prohibited from 
doing so.
140
 Yet law-social work collaborations, including those at 
organizations employing both lawyers and social workers, are 
relatively common.
141
 How do they handle the ethical dilemmas?  
The most commonly used method appears to be the construction 
of a confidentiality ―wall‖ designed to ―minimize the risk of 
inadvertent disclosure of client information related to suspected child 
abuse.‖142 The wall involves making sure all staff are aware of the 
restrictions; creating ―shadow files‖ for the use of the social worker 
to segregate protected and non-protected materials; training staff and 
students; monitoring and implementing the procedures; and 
discussing the social worker‘s duty to disclose with the client.143  
The need for a wall may be greater when lawyers share the same 
office or work under the same employer as social workers, because 
the risk of inadvertent disclosure is higher. Even when the lawyer 
 
 138. Engineers and lawyers may also be subject to statutory disclosure requirements under 
certain environmental statutes. See, e.g., CERCLA § 103(b)(3). A detailed analysis of these 
statutory obligations is beyond the scope of this article.  
 139. For example, Missouri‘s version requires a social worker who ―has reasonable cause 
to suspect that a child has been or may be subjected to abuse or neglect or observes a child 
being subjected to conditions or circumstances which would reasonably result in abuse or 
neglect‖ to immediately report to the Children‘s Division of the Department of Social Services. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 210.115(1) (2008). Failure to do so is a crime. MO. REV. STAT. § 210.165 
(2008). See also State v. Brown, 140 S.W.3d 51 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 2004) (holding that sections 
210.115 and 210.165 were not unconstitutionally vague and could be the basis for a criminal 
prosecution).  
 140. Some states include attorneys among persons who are required to report abuse and 
neglect, usually making an exception when the information is otherwise privileged. Adrienne 
Jennings Lockie, Salt in the Wounds: Why Attorneys Should Not Be Mandated Reporters of 
Child Abuse, 36 N.M. L. REV. 125, 126–28 (2006) (summarizing and categorizing state 
statutes).  
 141. Social workers work with lawyers in legal aid offices, public defenders‘ offices, elder 
law practices, and law school clinics. Social workers may be appointed by the court to work 
with juvenile defendants. See, e.g., Joseph J. Senna, Social Workers in Public Defender 
Programs, 20 SOC. WORK 271 (1975); Christina T. Pierce, Patricia Gleason-Wynn & Marilyn 
G. Miller, Social Work and Law: A Model for Implementing Social Services in a Law Office, 34 
J. GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 61 (2001).  
 142. St. Joan, supra note 136, at 439.  
 143. Id. at 440.  
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calls in the social worker as a consultant or expert witness, the need 
for confidentiality exists. In that circumstance, the lawyer might be 
the sole conduit for the social worker‘s information about the case 
and the client‘s problems,144 and still would have the responsibility to 
obtain the client‘s consent or wall off facts about the client that could 
trigger the social worker‘s statutory duty to report.145  
Assuming that the jurisdiction in which the collaboration occurs 
allows for it,
146
 one might be able to implement a similar system 
when lawyers and engineers work together at the same firm. At 
intake, the clients would be informed of differing duties of 
confidentiality and warned about the ramifications of the engineer‘s 
duty to disclose dangers to the public safety, health, and welfare. 
Perhaps the client would be reminded of the differing duties prior to 
additional consultations with the engineers. Having the client sign 
forms reflecting this understanding might also be a possibility. 
Separate files, including separate computer files, would be 
maintained so that the engineers would not have access to 
information that they might be required to report. Employees would 
be trained and monitored to reduce the chance of inadvertent 
disclosures, and perhaps also required to indicate in writing that they 
understand their responsibilities. Undoubtedly, it is a significant 
undertaking to implement such a system.  
There are some real dangers in screening engineers from 
information that is related to public health and safety. As one group 
 
 144. Steven Lubet, Expert Witnesses: Ethics and Professionalism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 465, 469 (1999) (discussing lawyer‘s provision of information about the case to 
retained consulting or testifying experts). 
 145. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility, Formal Op. 98-411 (Aug. 30, 1998) 
(discussing confidentiality when one lawyer consults another lawyer to obtain legal assistance 
about a problem). 
 146. Screening of nonlawyers from the rest of the firm where the nonlawyers are subject to 
mandatory reporting requirements is not specifically addressed by the Model Rules. The ABA 
recently amended the Model Rules to allow for a law firm‘s screening of lawyers facing certain 
types of conflicts, primarily imputed conflicts based upon an attorney‘s former representation of 
a client. MODEL RULES R. 1.10(a)(2) (amended Feb. 2009). This enables the firm to continue its 
representation of a client with a position adverse to a lawyer‘s former client, even though the 
lawyer is not allowed to participate personally. The comments to Model Rule 1.10 suggest that 
nonlawyers similarly should be screened from personal participation. MODEL RULES R. 1.10 
cmt. para. 4. Twenty-four states have adopted some type of screening rule. See Your ABA, RE: 
Report 109, http://www.abanet.org/media/youraba/200901/article021.html. 
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of authors explains, in the law-social work context: ―The ‗team‘ can 
never truly collaborate, because the social worker can never know 
confidently that the lawyers have not held back certain information to 
protect the client from the social worker‘s obligations.‖147 Just as the 
social worker‘s advice or counsel might be compromised because he 
or she did not know a key fact about a joint client‘s situation, so too 
could the engineer‘s advice or calculations be compromised if he or 
she were unaware of a flaw in a system being evaluated or did not 
have access to all parameters of a design.
148
 This is even more the 
case if the information held back or walled off is of the sort that the 
lawyer suspects would trigger the engineering expert‘s duty to protect 
the safety, health, and welfare of the public.  
Others take a different approach, arguing that when a social 
worker has ―no separate or preexisting professional relationship with 
the client whose secrets are at risk‖ and functions as a member of a 
―legal team,‖ the social worker has no duty to report.149 They 
conclude that the lawyer‘s ethical rules in effect trump the social 
worker‘s statutory duties because the social worker is not serving in 
the capacity of a social worker toward the lawyer‘s client.150 The 
social worker‘s client is, in essence, the lawyer or the law firm, and 
the social worker is akin to a ―legal assistant‖ rather than a social 
worker who is subject to the rules that apply to the profession.
151
 The 
authors reach the same conclusion whether the social worker is an 
employee of the law firm or serves as a consultant. The key factor 
 
 147. Anderson, Barenberg & Tremblay, supra note 136, at 713. 
 148. One famous engineering story involves such a missing detail that appeared 
insignificant in isolation but had a tremendous effect when the system was considered as a 
whole. The structural engineer who designed the Citicorp building in New York City learned 
after the fact that the joints on the bracing structure had been bolted, instead of being welded as 
originally planned. While substituting bolts for welding was within the authority of the 
subcontractors and not a violation of either the building code or engineering practice, under the 
building‘s unique circumstances, the skyscraper could fail when subject to strong diagonal 
winds. See Joe Morgenstern, The Fifty-Nine-Story Crisis, THE NEW YORKER, May 29, 1995, at 
45–53. In keeping with his duty to the public, the engineer in effect blew the whistle on himself, 
retrofitted the building, strengthened the joints, and averted the possible disaster. Id. 
 149. Anderson, Barenberg & Tremblay, supra note 136, at 709.  
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. at 703 (citing State Bar of Nevada Standing Comm. On Ethics and Prof‘l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 30 (2005)). The authors caution that there is only ―limited 
authority‖ for this position, and that this authority consists of ethics committee and attorney 
general opinions, rather than endorsement by trial or appellate courts. Id. at 700. 
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that triggers a duty to report is the existence of a therapeutic 
relationship with the client, not whether the lawyer and social worker 
are under the same roof.
152
 
Might the same be true for professional engineers working with 
lawyers? Conceptually, there are some similarities, at least in certain 
settings. A consulting professional engineer hired to serve as an 
expert witness for a company defending a product liability suit 
certainly is a member of the legal team. More likely than not, he or 
she has no preexisting professional relationship with the defendant. 
Perhaps the professional engineer serving as an expert could be said 
to perform the engineer‘s equivalent of the ―non-therapeutic‖ services 
a social worker provides when working with a legal team instead of 
directly with the client.
153
  
On closer examination, the differences between the social 
worker‘s statutory duty to report child abuse and the professional 
engineer‘s ethical duty to the public safety cause the analogy to break 
down. Most statutes requiring mandatory reporting of child abuse 
contain lists of the professionals to whom the duty applies, such as 
doctors, nurses, teachers, police officers, and childcare workers.
154
 In 
nearly every state, lawyers either are excluded from this list of 
professions or an exception is made for suspected abuse that was 
learned through the lawyer‘s communications with the client.155 By 
 
 152. Id. at 709–14 (analyzing several models of lawyer-social work collaborations).  
 153. Id. at 700–01, 709. Anderson et al. conclude that a social worker who works at a 
government agency or nonprofit that offers legal services would have a duty to report if the 
social worker had a therapeutic relationship with the client. Id. at 710–13. It follows that an 
engineer employed by a corporation more likely would have the kind of direct relationship with 
his or her employer that would not take the engineer out of the traditional engineering role. Id. 
at 710. 
 154. The Illinois statute, for example, lists at least thirty-eight professions or occupations 
and a ―catch-all‖ provision for ―any other foster parent, homemaker or child care worker.‖ 325 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/4 (West 2009). 
 155. In some cases, it is not clear whether lawyers retain their duty of confidentiality (as 
when they are not included in the list of professions required to report) but arguably fall under a 
catch-all provision requiring ―all other persons‖ to make a report. For a summary of state laws 
mandating reports of child abuse, see Katharyn I. Christian, Putting Legal Doctrines to the 
Test: The Inclusion of Attorneys as Mandatory Reporters of Child Abuse, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 
215, 233–34 (2008) (summarizing statutes as of 2005). More current, but less organized, 
information about state statutes may be found at the Child Welfare Information Gateway. See 
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: 
SUMMARY OF STATE LAWS (2008), http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol31/iss1/6
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excluding lawyers from the sweep of these statutes, the legislatures 
can be said to have made a choice between the lawyer‘s duty of 
confidentiality and the social desirability of protecting children by 
requiring reports of suspected abuse, and to have come down on the 
side of confidentiality, for good or ill.
156
 With that in mind, it is 
harder ―to conclude that a legislature intended that lawyers who hire 
social workers on staff should, simply because of that fact, suddenly 
be governed by the reporting duty.‖157  
It is not clear that any legislature or ethics committee or court can 
be said to have weighed the professional engineer‘s duty to protect 
the public against the lawyer‘s duty of confidentiality. The ethics 
rules for each profession evolved independently; no single body 
made a determination—even an oblique one—that confidentiality 
trumps public safety or vice versa. For this reason, it is more difficult 
to be confident that a lawyer who hires a professional engineer can 
avoid having the engineer act like an engineer.  
CONCLUSION  
As professionals, lawyers and engineers enjoy the benefits of 
autonomy and self-regulation. In exchange, they serve the public 
through the practice of their professions, although the terms of that 
service may not quite match the public‘s expectations. These 
conceptions of public service and duty drive the ethical rules of each 
profession.  
The professional ideals of lawyers and engineers embodied in 
their ethical regimes may collide when they must work 
collaboratively. Conflict avoidance, harmonization, and containment 
are three possible solutions to avoiding the most serious problems 
that may arise, as this Article suggests. 
 
statutes/mandaall.pdf. In those places where lawyers and social workers both have a mandate to 
report child abuse, the conflict does not arise.  
 156. See Anderson, Barenberg & Tremblay, supra note 136, at 701–02 (―One might debate 
the wisdom of that exclusion . . . one might cynically wonder whether the exclusion is 
principled at all . . . [b]ut as a matter of substantive law, the distinction between the professions 
is unambiguous.‖). 
 157. Id. at 702. 
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Professional engineers working with lawyers may be unable to 
completely remove their ―engineering hats,‖ but this is not 
necessarily a terrible thing. As one scholar has noted, ―[i]f 
professionals are not able to retain sufficient independence so as to 
defend their professional integrity in critical decisions, why, 
ultimately, pay a premium for their skills?‖158 If you hire engineers 
but ask them to take off their engineering hats, have you really hired 
engineers? After all, surely one of the many lessons of the Challenger 
disaster is that non-engineers should pay more attention to the 
engineer‘s judgment. 
 
 158. See DAVIS, supra note 62, at 170 (discussing professional autonomy and observing: 
―Why hire someone as an engineer for example, if you do not want him to work as engineers 
typically do?‖); Hugh P. Gunz & Sally P. Gunz, The Lawyer’s Response to Organizational 
Professional Conflict: An Empirical Study of the Ethical Decision Making of In-House Counsel, 
39 AM. BUS. L.J. 241, 249 (2002) (examining decision making by in-house lawyers).  
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